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n this paper, Reint Gropp, Jukka Vesala, and Giuseppe 
Vulpes provide an insightful perspective on the use of 
market prices in supervising large financial firms. They use 
European data to validate some of the conclusions previously 
drawn from the U.S. data. After Sironi (2001, 2003), this may 
be the first paper to examine European bond prices. The fact 
that European bond markets are generally considered less 
liquid than those in the United States tells us something 
important about the resilience of spread information in this 
context. The authors’ simultaneous evaluation of European 
banks’ equity data provides a rich set of tests and ideas.
The authors explicitly frame their analysis of assessing bank 
condition as a statistical forecasting problem. Such a forecasting 
perspective is naturally associated with efforts to use market 
information to predict future supervisory assessments. 
However, it is equally helpful in assessing whether market 
information can improve supervisory assessments about a 
financial firm’s current condition: supervisors and market 
investors both possess estimates of a firm’s true quality, and 
multiple estimates can be combined into a more accurate 
assessment of that quality.
Evaluating their empirical work in terms of forecasts, 
the authors assess the marginal contributions of market 
information relative to accounting information or ratings. 
Rather than simply observing changes in regression R2 
statistics, Gropp, Vesala, and Vulpes also report their forecasts’ 
“Type I” and “Type II” error rates: the frequency of failing to 
detect a true problem versus mistakenly identifying a sound 
firm as troubled. These classification error rates are much more 
meaningful than correlation coefficients to supervisors, who 
are charged with oversight of individual firms. Market 
information will never be fully incorporated into supervision 
unless researchers can devise a way to describe its value in terms 
of classification errors.
Another attractive feature of the study is its resurrection 
of equity data as a valid source of market information. In 
principle, equity and bond values both depend on the same 
parameters—a firm’s leverage and its asset volatility. Yet 
previous research has more frequently evaluated debenture 
spreads, because debenture payoffs seem more similar to those 
of depositors and the safety net. This contrasts with the “call 
option” nature of equity, for which an increase in risk can 
either raise or lower market value. (In extremis, subordinated 
debt also increases in value with asset volatility.) Although 
equity price changes may have ambiguous implications about 
firm condition, the authors show that an equity-based distance 
to default measure provides an unambiguous connection 
between share price information and firm condition.
Demonstrating the theoretical use of equity prices nicely 
complements several real-world dimensions of security prices. 
Bond price data are generally considered less accurate than 
share price information, and bond data are available for fewer 
firms. A bond’s “credit spread” also reflects more than just the 
market’s estimated probability of default losses. The corporate 
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bond spread must cover differential liquidity, the value of state 
and local taxes, and expected default losses. Longstaff (2004) 
estimates a pure liquidity differential worth 10 to 15 basis 
points between Refcorp and Treasury bonds, even though they 
have identical credit risks. Other recent papers estimate quite a 
surprisingly small default risk component. Delianedis and 
Geske (2001) assert that “default risk only accounts for about 
5 percent of the AAA credit spread and 22 percent of the BBB 
credit spread.” Huang and Huang (2002) attribute “less than 
20 percent” of the spread on investment-grade bonds to 
expected default losses. Elton et al. (2001) conclude that “in the 
case of ten-year corporates, 46.17 percent of the difference is 
unexplained by taxes or expected default.”
The ultimate value of bond versus stock information is an 
empirical issue, and we have rather little evidence (although see 
Krainer and Lopez [forthcoming]). The authors refer to some 
interesting work they have undertaken elsewhere (Gropp, 
Vesala, and Vulpes 2002), which demonstrates that both equity 
and bond prices provide valuable information, in the sense of 
mitigating the number of Type I forecast errors. Notably, the 
equity prices (distance to default) predict better at longer 
horizons while the bond prices (yield spread) predict better at 
shorter horizons. The authors speculate that the sensitivity of 
debt prices to risk changes increases sharply as a firm’s true 
quality deteriorates. Although this strikes me as plausible, I 
would like to see some calculations from their proofs of results 
1 and 2 demonstrating that asset risk and leverage affect the 
credit spread by ever-larger amounts as the issuer’s condition 
deteriorates.
From a supervisor’s perspective, the usefulness of market 
information in affirming or predicting the condition of 
financial firms seems quite limited. Compared with a model 
that uses only accounting information, the authors report that 
yield spreads and distance to default add only 6 percentage 
points to the in-sample R2. I suspect that supervisors have 
enough information of their own to rival the added 
explanatory power of these market measures. Unless we (as a 
profession) can improve upon this performance, the primary 
value of market information may lie in its ability to discipline 
supervisors. By specifying that sufficiently negative market 
information requires a public response from supervisors, we 
may be able to prevent some regulatory forbearance (Flannery 
2001; Flannery and Nikolova 2004).
This paper also raises an important question about how 
market information can be used to supervise financial 
conglomerates, or large complex banking organizations. We 
must (again) determine which financial activities warrant 
safety net protection and determine how (whether) security 
market information can provide information about the 
condition of those components of the overall firm.
In summary, Gropp, Vesala, and Vulpes provide an 
interesting perspective on a timely issue. Further research will 
be improved by applying their “forecasting” perspective on 
market information in the supervisory process.References
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